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US economics PhD programs varies with the state of the business cycle at applica-
tion and at graduation. Our results strongly support the predictions of a Roy-style
model of self-selection into sectors: We find that adverse macroeconomic conditions
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1 Introduction
There has been a growing interest in labor economics about the effect of macroe-
conomic conditions on microeconomic outcomes. In particular, recent studies have
found a substantial and persistent negative impact of recessions on individuals’ em-
ployment and earnings.1 Yet, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study which
examines whether individuals react to these recession shocks in terms of occupational
choice and the potential impact the reaction might have on the talent allocation and
productivity across sectors. Our paper fills this gap in the literature by looking at a
specific market where individual skills can readily be measured - academia.2
We study the impact of the business cycle at application and graduation on the
skill allocation in the academic labor market. This is done by relating the research
productivity and career choice of (potential) economists graduating from top 30 US
universities to the change in the unemployment rate during the last 50 years. To
guide our empirics, we develop a Roy-style model (1951) of the selection of talent
into business and academia, where entering academia is competitive but attractive
during recessions. The model predicts that, while less of the economists who faced a
recession at application to the PhD stay in academia after graduation, those who do
stay are a better selection of academic productivity. Moreover, if there is a recession
at the time of graduation, more economists pursue academic employment, which leads
to more publications per PhD graduate.
The results of the empirical analysis show that individuals do react to recession
shocks and they strongly support the theoretical predictions. Economists applying
or graduating during recessions publish significantly more than economists applying
or graduating in a boom. A recession at entry leads to less PhD students staying
in academia, a recession at graduation has the opposite effect. Moreover, the effects
are of economically substantial magnitude. Taking our estimates literally, we expect
1See, for example, Oreopoulos, Wachter, and Heisz (2008), Sullivan and von Wachter (2009),
Kahn (2010), Kondo (2008), Oyer (2006),Oyer (2008).
2We use the terms “talent” and “skill” interchangeably throughout this paper. It seems to us
that a lot of people think of skill as something that is acquired while talent is naturally endowed.
The results in our paper suggest that this difference may not be too great for (potential) PhD
economists.
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assistant professors from the cohort of graduate students who applied for the PhD
during the recession of 2008 (3.5% increase in unemployment) to be around 24 percent
more productive than assistant professors from a cohort applying in an average year
(0% unemployment change). We also expect PhD graduates from 2008 to produce
on average 20 percent more publication output than economists graduating in an
average year.
Our results contribute to several discussions in the academic literature: First,
they show that individuals strongly and persistently react to (temporary) shocks in
terms of career choice, which leads to a change in the allocation of talent among
sectors. This adds to the broader debate about the allocation of talent, especially in
the financial sector and in teaching.3 Second, by observing that individuals at the
top of the skill distribution switch among sectors we infer that they possess general
ex-ante skills and that even ex-post, after six years of specific PhD training, some
individuals’ skills are general enough to go back to the private sector. This relates
to the born versus made debate in labor economics (e.g. Bertrand 2009, Oyer 2008).
Third, our results imply that it is possible to lure talent to research by increasing
their wages. Fourth, we note that the predictions of a Roy-style model are strongly
supported by the data in our quasi-experimental empirical setting.
For our empirical analysis we construct a new dataset of economists’ career choice
and publication output from publicly available sources. The dataset consists of grad-
uation years and the degree granting universities of 13624 PhDs since 1955 from the
top 30 American institutions. We match each person with all their publications avail-
able on JStor and with an indicator for becoming a faculty member or a member of
the American Economic Association (AEA) after the PhD. Thus, we can calculate
the propensity to stay in academia and the publication output for each economist.
Finally, we aggregate each cohort according to its university and graduation year, and
match macroeconomic (labor market) conditions at application to and at graduation
from the PhD. In the analysis we use standard OLS regressions to quantify the influ-
3See, for example, Philippon and Reshef (2009), Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2010) and
Nickell and Quintini (2002).
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ence of labor market conditions at application and at graduation on both, economists’
propensity to decide in favour of academic employment and on their productivity.4
Our paper is closely related to three distinct strands of literature. First, as men-
tioned above, we contribute to the recent literature that analyzes the effect of business
cycle shocks on individuals’ careers. Kahn (2010) finds large and persistent negative
wage effects of graduating from college in a worse economy. Oreopoulos, Wachter,
and Heisz (2008) show that university graduates who enter the labor market during
a recession experience a substantial initial loss of earning which fades only after 8-10
years, but that more highly skilled graduates suffer less because they switch to better
firms rapidly.5 Our study is the first to look at highly skilled individuals’ response
to these recession shocks by changing careers and its effect on the skill composition
in one of the affected sectors. The results are consistent with those of Oreopoulos,
Wachter, and Heisz (2008), as we find that more highly skilled individuals (are able
to) respond more strongly.
The second strand of literature we contribute to is concerned with sorting in the
labor market. While the papers above generally find that vertical, non-voluntary
sorting (i.e. worse job placements whose effects are long-lasting) is the source of the
negative impact of recession shocks, we consider horizontal, voluntary sorting (i.e.
the individual’s decision to continue his career in a different sector). In two papers
in 2006 and 2008, Paul Oyer estimates the effect of vertical sorting on long term
earnings and productivity by instrumenting MBAs’ and economists’ first placements
with the state of the economy at the time of graduation. Combining Oyer’s and our
paper on economics PhDs, it may well be that we underestimate the strength of our
selection effect because of his placement effect and vice versa.6
There are plenty of well-known studies that are concerned with the sectoral se-
4We use the change in unemployment instead of recession indicators as our preferred explanatory
variable throughout. We do this because it is continuous and thus carries more information and
because it may quite accurately proxy the change in the relative attractiveness of private sector
employment for our individuals.
5Other papers in this literature include Sullivan and von Wachter (2009),von Wachter, Song, and
Manchester (2008), and Kondo (2008).
6For a more detailed explanation, see section 4.4.
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lection of skills and the empirical content of the Roy model.7 These papers employ
“structural” econometric techniques while our quasi-experimental study doesn’t need
to rely on specific distributional assumptions about skills, for example. We nonethe-
less find strong empirical support for the predictions of the Roy model. Another
influential recent study by Philippon and Reshef (2009) describes the relationship
between relative wages and human capital in the financial sector in the United States
over the last century, but it is unable to establish a causal effect of the former on the
latter. In contrast, we are able to shed some light on the causal relationship between
sectoral attractiveness and talent allocation.8
The third group of literature this paper deals with is concerned with the deter-
minants of scientific productivity and their potential policy implications.9 Our study
is most closely related to the papers that examine the impact of science funding on
research productivity. Funding increases, like recessions, raise the attractiveness of
the academic sector compared to the private sector. Goolsbee (1998) shows that up
to 50% of a government spending increase go into higher salaries for scientists and
engineers. Suggesting that the supply of such knowledge workers is relatively inelas-
tic, he argues that a large fraction of governmental research funding may in fact be
ineffective and may only constitute a windfall gain for scientists. On the contrary,
our results imply that, depending on the exact institutional realities,10 the quantity
and/or quality of researchers should strongly and persistently increase with more
funding.11
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We derive our theoretical predic-
7See, for example, Heckman and Honoré (1990) and, more recently, Keane and Wolpin (1997)
and Lee and Wolpin (2006).
8One paper that uses quasi-experimental identification to study sectoral selection is Bedard and
Herman (2008). However, they do not explicitly study its effect on sectoral talent allocation and
they lack a theoretical framework to support and extrapolate their empirics.
9Some recent studies have exploited exogenous shocks to cooperations between scientists in order
to better understand the importance of peer effects (e.g. Waldinger 2009, Azoulay, Zivin, and Wang
2008). Other studies suggest that new communication technologies have changed the production
and the dissemination of research (e.g. Kim, Morse, and Zingales 2006, Ellison 2007).
10Depending on whether there is a fixed or a flexible number of spaces in the academic sector.
This may differ between the short- and the long run with the number of spaces adjusting over time.
11Along these lines, Freeman and van Reenen (2009) assert that, at least in the long run, not
only the number of scientists but also the selection of talent into science will increase due to higher
salaries.
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tions from a modified version of the Roy Model in the next section. Then we describe
how we assembled our novel dataset of PhD economists’ publication success. Section
4 presents and interprets the empirical results while section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
We are interested in how the selection of skills into academia and business varies with
the state of the business cycle. This section modifies a standard Roy (1951) model for
the problem at hand. The Roy model analyzes the self-selection of individuals with
heterogeneous skills into sectors according to their highest expected earnings. In the
following, we model two sectors - academia and business - into which individuals can
self-select. Each individual has distinct skills (and therefore different wages) in each
sector but can only choose one occupation. The main departure from the original
Roy framework is that salaries in business vary with the business cycle and that the
number of open positions in academia is assumed to be fixed.
2.1 Assumptions
Suppose that individuals are endowed with two skills, an academic skill α and a
business skill β. There are two sectors, academia (A) and business (B), which pro-
duce output utilizing the respective skills. Individuals are maximizing their expected
lifetime income by applying for jobs in academia or business.
The business sector is assumed to hire anyone with a wage wt corresponding to
their marginal product. The wage depends on the state of the business cycle yt, i.e.
a business employee’s marginal product is higher in a boom (high yt) and lower in a
recession (low yt):12
wB(β) = β + yt
On the contrary, salaries in the academic sector do not vary with the business cycle
12We might adopt the more general notion of yapp and ygrad as the effect of the business cycle on
current wage, but also on career outcomes in the future. This interpretation is consistent with recent
papers that find substantial effects of the current business cycle on long term career outcomes, e.g.
Oyer (2008) or Oreopoulos, Wachter, and Heisz (2008).
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and each worker is deterministically paid corresponding to his marginal productivity13
wA(α) = α.
To become an academic, an individual must decide for academia twice: First by
applying for a PhD program (at application t = app) and a second time in pursuing
an assistant professorship after the PhD (at graduation t = grad). At application,
we assume that PhD programs admit the best N applicants only and that there
are always more applicants than available spaces. Thus, the entry into the doctoral
program is competitive. This assumption seems reasonable as we consider the top
30 PhD programs in the US only. At graduation, we assume that the student can
choose freely if he wants to stay in academia or enter the business sector, instead.
This assumption is much more disputable: obtaining an assistant professorship at
a (top)ranked institution is very competitive. However, conditioned on graduating
from one of the top 30 US economics departments it seems unlikely that a student
cannot secure an academic job in a lower ranked institution, a teaching college or a
university outside the United States.
When taking his decision to apply for a PhD program, the applicant should also
take account of the option value of having another choice about his career path after
graduation. To simplify our problem, we assume that this option value is a constant,
i.e. that it does not vary with the state of the macroeconomy at application.14 Thus,
we can include it in the individual’s expected earnings as an academic α.
Given these assumptions, every individual compares the expected earnings from
academia α and business β+yt at application and at graduation. He decides to apply
13We can interpret α more generally as a combination of an individual’s marginal product in
academia and his non-pecuniary payoff for working in such an environment.
14In effect, the assumption amounts to imposing that the business cycle at application has no
predictive power for the business cycle at graduation. We think that this is defendable as it takes
on average six years to complete a PhD and we show in appendix C that there is no correlation
between the business cycle at application and graduation in our data. In general, we expect that
our results should also hold in all of the cases where there is reversal in the business cycle over that
time frame, i.e. Pr(yBoomgrad |yRecapp ) > Pr(yBoomgrad |yBoomapp ) and Pr(yRecgrad|yBoomapp ) > Pr(yRecgrad|yRecapp ), and
in a lot of cases where there is sufficiently strong mean reversion.
6
for the academic sector (the PhD program or the assistant professorship) whenever
α > β + yt. (1)
with t ∈ {app, grad}.15
2.2 Predictions
We are interested in how the selection of skills into academia and business varies with
the state of the business cycle. To ease the exposition, we compare a generic boom
versus a recession cohort, i.e. yBoom > yRec. All the proofs are relegated to appendix
A.
Proposition 2.1 For PhD applicants, the joint distribution of academic- and busi-
ness skills selected into the academic sector during recession first order stochastically
dominates (FSD) the corresponding boom distribution.16
Proof See appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates proposition 2.1 when academic and business skills are dis-
tributed uniformly on the unit interval. Given our assumptions, individuals’ ca-
reer choice is governed by the “one-shot” decision with those individuals preferring
academia for whom α > β + yapp. During boom (a high yBoomapp ), less individuals
apply for academia than during recession (a low yRecapp ), which is depicted by a higher
cutoff line for the former than for the latter. Academic employers always hire a fixed
number of N graduates (PhDs+“only in boom” in boom, PhDs+“only in recession”
15We could have added to the model that a PhD constitutes an (uncertain) investment into
academic (and business) skills. This is clearly an important feature of obtaining graduate education
and we have done it in an earlier version of this section. However, as long as the skill update and
the uncertainty about it can be assumed independent of the state of business cycle, it doesn’t do
anything to the predictions of the model other than adding noise.
16On the flipside, this implies that the joint distribution of skills selected into business in boom
first order stochastically dominates its recession counterpart. Note that, in contrast to the well-
known result of the general Roy model (e.g. see Heckman and Honoré 1990), we can make a
definitive statement about the stochastic dominance for a general distribution of skills here. This
is due to the assumption of quantity constraints and the resulting competitive admission into the
academic sector.
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in recessions) and therefore the distribution of skills for the recession cohort lies to
the “North-East” of the corresponding distribution of the boom cohort.
Figure 1: Selection with a U(0,1) distribution of both skills at application.
However, proposition 2.2 shows that fewer of the PhDs who applied in a recession
will decide to stay in academia and become assistant professors after the PhD.
Proposition 2.2 For every realization of the state of the economy at graduation
ygrad, a (weakly) higher fraction of the members of a “recession at application” cohort
will not decide to stay in academia after the PhD.
Proof See appendix.
The proposition implies that, “on average”, cohorts of PhD graduates more often
want to leave academia if they experienced a recession at the time of application.
Figure 2 provides some intuition for the proposition. The academic skill cutoff above
which individuals will prefer academic employment after the PhD, “on average” moves
down to the dashed line in the figure for a boom cohort and up for a recession cohort.
Thus, in the figure, some individuals of the recession cohort want to exit academia
and enter business after the PhD when the economy is out of recession, while everyone
of the boom cohort wants to stay in academia. The recession graduates who want to
leave academia here are the marginal ones who applied for the PhD “because of” the
recession in the first place.
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Figure 2: Selection with a U(0,1) distribution of both skills at graduation.
Proposition 2.3 For any given realization of the business cycle at graduation ygrad,
the (partial) distribution of academic skills of the members of a “recession at appli-
cation” cohort who want to stay in academia after the PhD FSD the distribution of
skills of the corresponding members of the “boom at application” cohort.17
Proof See appendix.
Proposition 2.3 implies that, no matter how many more recession than boom PhD
students leave academia after the PhD, the recession individuals who want to stay in
academia are still better in each quantile of their (academic) skill distribution. In our
specific example in figure 2 we see that, although some mass of the recession cohort
is cut off, the recession distribution of skills in academia still lies to the “North-East”
of the boom distribution.
The effect of the business cycle at graduation is more straightforward. During a
recession, more graduates decide to take up academic employment than during boom.
For these graduates who enter academia “because of” the business cycle the following
equation holds: β + yRecgrad < α ≤ β + yBoomgrad .
Proposition 2.4 restates this observation and figure 3 provides a graphical rep-
resentation in the special case of PhD graduates with academic and business skills
17However, the stochastic dominance of the joint distribution of business- and academic skills
does not feed through in general. The proof in appendix A shows that one can come up with
counterexamples.
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distributed uniformly in the unit square.
Proposition 2.4 A higher fraction of PhD economists decide to stay in the academic
sector if they experience a recession at graduation.
Figure 3: Selection at graduation.
Finally, we can reformulate the three propositions of the model into empirical
predictions for our data:
1. Economists who experienced a recession at application for the PhD are less
likely to stay in academia after graduation (from proposition 2.2).
2. However, if they stay, they are better researchers, both, on average and in each
quantile of their publication distribution (from proposition 2.3).
3. Economists who experienced a recession at graduation from the PhD are more
likely to stay in academia (from proposition 2.4),
4. and, therefore, recession PhD graduates are publishing more on average (also
from proposition 2.4).
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3 Data
We collect a new dataset of career choice and individual productivity for a large
sample of economists in the United States from 1955 to 2004. We aggregate the indi-
viduals to university year cohorts and match these with the change in unemployment
in the year of application and the year of graduation.18
3.1 Economist Sample Selection
The basis of our dataset are the names, graduation years and PhD granting institu-
tions of 13624 economists who graduated from the top 30 US universities from 1955
to 1994. The data is obtained from the American Economic Association’s (AEA)
yearly “List of Doctoral Dissertations in Economics”, which was published in the Pa-
pers and Proceedings issue of the “American Economic Review” until 1986 and in the
“Journal of Economic Literature” thereafter. We supplement this information with
the tier of the degree granting university according to the ranking of the National
Research Council.19
3.2 Career Choice and Productivity Measures
We add an “academic” indicator which obtains a value of one if the respective
economist was a faculty member in a US economics, business or finance department
in 2001 or if he was listed as a member of the American Economic Association and a
zero otherwise. The US faculty directories are compiled by James R. Hasselback and
18For the details of the data collection procedure please refer to appendix B.
19The National Research Council rankings of economics graduate programs divide programs into
tiers. The top three tiers include:
• Tier 1 (ranked 1-6): Chicago, Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Stanford and Yale
• Tier 2 (ranked 7-15): Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, Northwestern, Pennsylvania,
Rochester, California-Berkeley, UCLA, and Wisconsin-Madison
• Tier 3 (ranked 16-30): Illinois-Urbana, Boston University, Brown, Cornell, Duke, Iowa,
Maryland, Michigan State, New York University, North Carolina, Texas-Austin, Virginia,
California-San Diego, University of Washington, and Washington University-St. Louis.
Source: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AEA/gradstudents/
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made available on his webpage.20 AEA Membership data is obtained from the Amer-
ican Economic Association Directory of Members in 1970, 1974, 1981, 1985, 1989,
1993, 1997, 2003 or 2007. AEA membership somewhat serves as a proxy for faculty
membership outside of the United States, because Hasselback’s faculty directories
strongly focus on US colleges and feature only very few foreign institutions.
In order to compare the oeuvres of different economists over time we calculate a
consistent measure of publication productivity. For all economists in our sample, we
collect the publication records in the first ten years after their graduation, multiply
each publication of an author by its weight (“publication points”) according to a
dynamic journal ranking, and divide it by the number of coauthors of the paper. We
then sum up all these contributions within the ten years after graduation to obtain
a productivity measure for every individual in our sample.
More specifically, we match the PhD graduates with their publications (includ-
ing journal title, number of pages and the number and identity of co-authors) in 74
journals listed in Jstor, a leading online archive of academic journals. We select all
journals contained in Jstor for which a ranking was available. Thus we include all ma-
jor publications in economics and finance except the journals published by Elsevier,
most notably the “Journal of Monetary Economics” and the “Journal of Economet-
rics”.21 To ensure comparability among researchers, we restrict our attention to the
first ten years of publication. Jstor currently only provides full publication data up
to the year 2004. With the ten year requirement we can thus rightfully analyze the
sample from 1955 to 1994 without placing younger researchers at a disadvantage.
Comparing the value of the collected publications records for different researchers
over the decades is difficult because the relative impact of economics journals has
changed substantially over time (Kim, Morse, and Zingales 2006). Therefore, we
construct a dynamic journal ranking with decade specific publication points for each
journal from 1950 onwards. For the 1960s to the 1980s, we use the ranking from
Laband and Piette (1994), for the 1990s the equivalent ranking published in Kalaitzi-
20Source: http://www.facultydirectories.com/
21Because we do not believe that either recession or boom cohorts systematically prefer or dislike
Elsevier journals, this should be of no issue.
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dakis, Mamuneas, and Stengos (2003) and for the 2000s the recursive discounted
ranking available on the “ideas” webpage, respectively.22 For the 1950s we were not
able to find a journal ranking and thus decided to extrapolate a ranking for articles
published in the 1950s from our 1960s ranking. A complete list of these journals with
their associated publication points can be found in table 6 of appendix B.4.
Reassuringly, we show in appendix E.3 that our results are extremely robust
to using several other intuitive productivity measures: publication points assigned
according to the now very popular h-index, raw counts of articles written, and, most
notably, counts of articles in the five top economics journals (as in Oyer 2006) plus
the Journal of Finance.
3.3 Macro Data and PhD Entry Date
The main aim of our study is to relate the publication success of economists to a
proxy for the state of the macroeconomy at application to and graduation from their
PhD program. As our data contains only person-specific graduation dates, we infer
the application date by subtracting the median duration of a PhD of 6 years from the
graduation date.23 As proxy for the state of the business cycle, we use the change in
the rate of unemployment from june of the precedent year to june of the considered
year. Therefore, we measure the creation of new jobs right before the start of the
PhD program (at application) and during the academic job market (at graduation).
Unlike other potential proxies for the business cycle, for example job openings for
university graduates or financial services activity, unemployment data is available for
the entire study period.24 Unemployment change is also a continuous variable and,
therefore, preserves more information than, for example, mere recession indicators.
Finally, we believe that the change in unemployment is a good proxy for the change
in university graduates’ private sector employment opportunities, i.e. their outside
22Refer to http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.rdiscount.html. Note, however, that
the ranking on the website is updated continuously and thus is not exactly the same as we use in
this study.
23The median duration of a PhD stayed almost constant with five to six years since the 1970s (see
table 7).
24We are indebted to Paul Oyer for sharing his data on financial services activity.
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option from academia. Please refer to robustness section in the appendix E for a
sensitivity analysis with regard to the duration of the PhD and with GDP growth as
an alternative proxy for the state of the business cycle.
3.4 Aggregation to University-Year Level
Eventually, we manipulate the data in one other aspect which is appealing from an
econometric perspective. We group our graduates’ publication performances and the
indicator for being an academic or not into university-graduation year averages. Thus,
we reduce the number of our observations from 13,624 individuals who graduated
from tier one, two and three universities between 1955 to 1994 to 933 cohort means.
Because we do not use any explanatory or control variables that vary below the
university-year level, the grouping entails no loss of information and the calculation
of standard errors becomes significantly easier.25
3.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the PhD cohorts’ average productivity, the
average probability to become an academic and the macroeconomic variation.
The average ten year productivity of a university-year cohort is about 31.49 pub-
lication points. In order to translate these publication points in terms of articles in a
certain journal, one has to take into account that the importance of journals changes
over time. For example, an article in the American Economic Review (AER) in the
1990s was worth 100 publication points while it was “only” worth 40.2 points in the
1980s.26 Therefore, the average ten year productivity of a university-year cohort in
the full sample is about the equivalent of a third of an AER article in the 1990s.
The average probability to become an academic is about 60% and is slightly falling
over time as we can see in figure (4a). Conditioned on being an academic, the average
25Angrist and Pischke (2008, 312-315) argue that grouping has advantages from a statistical
perspective because the cohort averages should be close to normally distributed even with modest
group sizes and there is no need for clustering standard errors on the group level anymore.
26Please refer to appendix B.4 for a more detailed interpretation.
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mean sd min max p10 p90
Productivity 31.49 84.89 0.00 1738.10 0.00 93.80
Productivity Academic 48.14 103.84 0.00 1738.10 0.00 144.72
Academic 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Unempl Change (Application) -0.01 1.13 -2.10 2.90 -1.10 2.10
Unempl Change (Graduation) 0.02 1.03 -2.10 2.90 -0.90 1.50
Observations 13624
Table 1: Summary Statistics
ten year cohort productivity totals 48.14 publication points. This is about 50% of an
article in the AER in the 1990s.
Figure 4b depicts the average productivity of the PhD cohorts for every year in
our analysis. More specifically, it distinguishes between the average productivity of
all graduates and graduates that becoming an academic. As expected, we see that
the performance measures move together to a substantial degree.
The change in the unemployment rate, our main independent variable, has a mean
value of zero. The 10% quantile is -1.1% and the 90% quantile is 2.1% for the change
in the rate of unemployment at application. At graduation, the 10% quantile is -0.9%
and the 90% quantile 1.5%. Figure (4c) plots the change in the unemployment rate
of each cohort at application and at graduation from 1955 to 1994. As expected the
change in unemployment exhibits significant variation over the years.
4 Results
In the following we examine the empirical predictions derived from the modified Roy
model:
1. Economists who experienced a recession at application for the PhD are less
likely to stay in academia after graduation (from proposition 2.2).
2. However, if they stay, they are better researchers, both, on average and in each
quantile of their publication distribution (from proposition 2.3).
3. Economists who experienced a recession at graduation from the PhD are more
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(a) Probability to become an academic (b) Research productivity
(c) Unemployment Change
Figure 4: Dependent and independent variables over time
likely to stay in academia (from proposition 2.4),
4. and, therefore, recession PhD graduates are publishing more on average (also
from proposition 2.4).
4.1 Graphical Relationship and Empirical Specification
To get an initial sense of the degree to which the unemployment change at application
and at graduation are related to the career decisions and productivity of economists,
the upper panel in figures 5 to 7 plots these variables over time. Moreover, the lower
panel in each figure illustrates with a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression
the degree of association of unemployment change and our outcome variables. The
shaded areas indicate the 90% confidence interval.
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(a) at application (b) at graduation
Figure 5: Productivity and unemployment change
In accordance with our theoretical prediction 1, unemployment change at ap-
plication seems to correlate slightly negatively with the propensity to become an
academic (left panel of figure 6). The publication productivity of academics in the
left panel of figure 7 correlates positively with unemployment change at application
as in prediction 2. In accordance with predictions 3 and 4, a more positive change
in unemployment at graduation seems to be associated with more PhDs staying in
academia (right panel of figure 6) and a better publication record (right panel of
figure 5), respectively. From the local polynomial smooths, we also infer that much
of the effect stems from unemployment increases of 2% and above. This suggests that
career decisions and talent selection are strongly affected during times of distress in
the private sector.
In order to analyze more formally the relationships depicted in figures 5 to 7, we
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(a) at application (b) at graduation
Figure 6: Fraction of academics and unemployment change
estimate the following model in three different specifications:
qi,t = β · yapp,t + γ · ygrad,t + δ · controls+ i,t (2)
In the first specification, the outcome variable qi,t is the average publication output
of a cohort of graduates from a university i in a year t. In the second specification, it
is the average propensity to decide in favour of an academic career after the PhD, and
in the third specification, qi,t is the average productivity of those who have decided
to stay in academia after the PhD. The unit of observation in all three cases is the
average of a given university in a given year, weighted by the amount of underlying
individual observations in all three regressions.27
27In order to obtain correct standard errors, Angrist and Pischke (2008, 313-314) recommend
averaging the individual outcome variables if there are no regressors or controls that vary below the
group level and to weight these averages by the underlying individual observations. The standard
18
(a) at application (b) at graduation
Figure 7: Productivity of academics and unemployment change
The regressors yapp,t and ygrad,t of interest are the unemployment changes at ap-
plication and at graduation, respectively. As control variables, we include dummies
for the full set of interactions of university and graduation decade. These dummies
pick up the (changing) quality differences of PhD education among universities over
time and they control for the higher standards of publication in recent decades (e.g.
Ellison 2002a, Ellison 2002b).28
We estimate equation (2) using linear regressions. To identify the average treat-
ment effect of the change in unemployment on the respective outcome variable, we
errors are then clustered on the graduation year level to allow for contemporaneous correlation
between the outcome variables in the presence of regressors that do not vary within a given year
(again see Angrist and Pischke (2008)).
28We have run regressions using GDP growth as a measure of the business cycle instead of un-
employment change and we explored variants with linear and quadratic time trends. We also used
different measures for research productivity. Our results are robust to these changes and reported
in appendix E.
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assume that the productivity and the career decisions of a cohort of (potential) PhD
economists do not contemporaneously affect the business cycle in a given year. This
assumption excludes potential reverse causality.29 To be able to interpret β and γ
exclusively as the causal parameters of the selection effect discussed in the theory
section, we need an additional exclusion restriction to be satisfied: We assume that
unemployment change affects a cohort’s career decisions and publications only in
terms of changing their choice of the sector to apply to (the selection effect). This
assumption might not strictly be true in the light of the result of Oyer (2006) that
the state of the business cycle affects an economist’s first job placement and thus his
productivity. We explain in section 4.4 that given Oyer’s result we might actually
underestimate the causal effect of selection in our regressions due to leaving out the
quality of the first job.
Table 2 summarizes the main regression results of the three specifications, each
in one column. The following subsections explain the columns in turn.
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 1.540∗∗ -0.891 3.274∗∗∗
(0.661) (0.576) (0.945)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.312∗∗∗ 1.354∗∗ 2.738∗∗
(0.645) (0.607) (1.199)
Subsample All All Academic
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2: The main regression results
4.2 Effect on the Publications of all PhDs
The first column of table 2 shows the effect of unemployment change on the pub-
lication output of an average PhD graduate in the sample. Unemployment change,
29Furthermore, no third factor is allowed to influence both directly - the business cycle and, the
career decisions and productivity. This is the is the ubiquitous conditional independence assumption.
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both at application and at graduation, has a significantly positive effect on research
productivity on the 5% and 1% level, respectively. These two results are also eco-
nomically substantial: a cohort on the 90% quantile of unemployment change at
application is expected to achieve 4.9 publication points more than a cohort on the
10% quantile. This is approximately 12 % of the mean.
Similarly, if we do the same calculation for the graduation cohort, the difference
is 5.5 points, which is 17.6 % of the mean.30
The effect of the unemployment change at graduation is in line with empirical
prediction 4: PhDs who graduate during a recession are publishing more on average
because more of them decide to stay in academia. Thus, the theoretical effect is at the
“extensive margin” as opposed to an “intensive margin” effect in which those PhDs
who would have stayed in academia anyway are publishing more if they graduate in
recession than if they graduate in a boom.
The theory does not make a prediction which overall effect unemployment change
at application should have on the publication output of an average PhD graduate. On
the one hand, according to proposition 2.1 graduates who experienced a recession at
application constitute a better selection of individuals. On the other hand, according
to proposition 2.2 less of these individuals are expected to stay in academia and
publish after the PhD. Empirically, it seems that the former effect dominates the
latter, as a rise of unemployment at application is associated with a higher publication
output of an average PhD.
4.3 Effect on the Career Decision
The second column of table 2 reports how the unemployment change is related to
economists’ career decisions after the PhD.
30Referring to table 1, the difference between the 10 and the 90 percent quantile of unemployment
change at application is 3.2. Multiplying this by the parameter estimate of 1.540 gives a difference
in average productivity between “boom” and “recession” cohorts of 4.92 publication points. Refer-
ring to table 6, this is about the number of publication points one gets assigned for an article in
“Economica” during the 1990s. From table 1, we also find that the “average” PhD graduate achieves
31.49 publication points. Similarly at graduation the difference between the 90% and 10% quantile
is 2.4. Multiplying this with the estimate of 2.312, yields 5.549 publication points, which is about
17.6% of the mean of 31.49.
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PhD graduates are more likely to stay in academia when the economy is ailing,
i.e. when there is a positive change in unemployment at graduation. The estimated
coefficient is significant on the 5% level. This confirms empirical prediction 3 from
the theory section and it is the source of the “extensive margin” effect on publica-
tion output per PhD student we mentioned above. Taking the estimates literally, a
member of the cohort on the 90% quantile of unemployment change at graduation
(+1.5%) has a 3.24 % higher probability to become an academic compared to a PhD
student graduating on the 10% quantile (-0.9%). The average propensity to become
an academic is 60%.
The theory also predicts that economists who experience a recession at entry to
the PhD are less likely to stay in academia afterwards because some of them will enter
only because of the recession (prediction 1).31 The evidence in table 2 implies the
existence of this effect, although the reported coefficient is not statistically significant.
More generally, we are not sure about the right empirical equivalent to the binary
decision between academia and business regarding our theory. We think three differ-
ent concepts of someone being an “academic” are conceivable. First, one could only
consider faculty members of higher learning institutions as academics. This definition
leaves out research staff at the IMF, the World Bank and at research institutes. Sec-
ond, one could argue that the relevant distinguishing characteristic of an academic is
producing novel and original research. And finally, one could more generally consider
anyone an academic who works on research-related topics and upholds a relationship
with the academic community.
The evidence reported in table 2 is based on the third notion of an academic
by classifying anyone as such who is either a faculty member or a member of the
American Economic Association (AEA) after the PhD. Table 3 additionally shows
our measure of an academic according to the first two notions.
Column two in this table shows the propensity to become an academic measured
by whether graduates end up as members of faculty of an economics, business or
31In a sense they hibernate in graduate school until the winter in the private sector is over and
then they return there.
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Academic Faculty Publish Academic
Unempl Change (Application) -0.891 -0.427 -0.979∗∗ -1.716∗∗∗
(0.576) (0.475) (0.457) (0.579)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 1.354∗∗ 0.535 0.414 2.866∗∗∗
(0.607) (0.409) (0.397) (0.938)
Subsample All All All Tier 1
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1068 234
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: Different measures for being classified as academic
finance department of a college or university in the United States according to the
listings published by Hasselback (2001). We see that the direction of the effect is
the same as in column one and in the main results table. However, the resulting
coefficients are not statistically significant for either point in time. This might be
the case because the employed faculty listings are not exhaustive. For example,
faculty on leave are not included and we do not have faculty directories for other law
and agriculture departments. Our faculty listings are also strongly focused on US
institutions. Thus, they miss out many foreign graduates who become professors in
their home countries and are members of the AEA.
Column three defines an academic as an individual who, according to our data,
publishes at least one article in a ranked scientific journal after its PhD. The effect
of the business cycle at application is strongly significant in the direction we expect
from the theory while the effect at graduation is weak and not significant.32
Column 4 in Table 3 also shows regressions for the propensity to become an
academic (according to our preferred academic measure) for a subsample of our grad-
uates from the six top-ranked universities, i.e. the tier one schools. The effect here
32This seems to confirm the different reasons for becoming an academic in relation to the two
points in time: on the one hand, those individuals who become an academic because the economy
is bad at graduation are just added at the extensive margin and some of them might not be able
to write a ranked article. On the other hand, those individuals who experienced a recession at
application and decide against academia after the PhD are of high academic ability according to
the theory. Thus, a larger share of them would have been able to write a ranked article had they
stayed in academia.
23
is strongly significant in the predicted direction for both, unemployment change at
graduation and at application. We interpret this as evidence that it is actually the
individuals at the very top of the skill distribution which are most able to successfully
switch back and forth between academia and business and who thus possess what one
could call general skills. Overall, we conclude that the results at hand support the
predictions made by our theory about the career decisions of PhD graduates.
4.4 Effect on the Publications of Academics
The last column of table 2 shows the results of regressing the publication output of
individuals classified as academics on the change in the unemployment rate. The
results here are largely robust to the sample selection according to any of the three
definitions of an academic that were discussed above (see table 15 in appendix E.2).
The productivity of academics who experienced a recession at application is higher
compared to academics who applied during a boom. This is in line with prediction
2 which states that the selection of PhD entrants is better during economically diffi-
cult times and that this better selection persists to the PhD graduates who stay in
academia. The coefficient is significant on the 1% level and of economically relevant
magnitude: Comparing the average member of the cohort on the 90% quantile of
unemployment change at application to a cohort member on the 10% quantile, the
former is on average 10.47 publication points better than the latter. This is about
20% of the mean.33
In fact, prediction 2 states that a generic recession cohort should first order
stochastically dominate a generic boom cohort with respect to academic skill and
that hence not only the mean but the whole distribution of academic skills should
shift to the right if unemployment increases. Table 4 shows the effect of the unem-
ployment change on the distribution of publication output within each cohort using
quantile regressions. Hence, a unit of observation is now an individual academic’s
33The 10% quantile of unemployment change at application is -1.1, the 90% quantile is 2.10 and
the difference is therefrore 3.2%. Multiplying this difference with the mean estimate of 3.274 yields
10.4768. The mean productivity for an academic is 48.14 publication points.
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publication output. Moreover, the measure of our variable of interest (academic skill)
is left-censored as publication output cannot have values below zero. Following An-
grist and Pischke (2008, 276-277), we limit the sample to individuals with a positive
publication record.34 We see that indeed - as predicted by the theory - all of the re-
ported quantiles of the publication distribution are positively affected by an increase
of unemployment at application.
10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Unempl Change (Application) 0.411∗∗ 1.102∗∗∗ 2.285∗∗∗ 7.636∗∗∗ 13.613∗∗∗
(0.194) (0.382) (0.873) (2.068) (5.053)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 0.560∗∗∗ 1.005∗∗ 1.459∗ 4.034∗ 3.038
(0.199) (0.395) (0.878) (2.073) (5.126)
Subsample Publish Publish Publish Publish Publish
Tier-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4526 4526 4526 4526 4526
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4: Quantile regression for the academic subsamples
The second line in column three of the main results table 2 reports the effect of the
unemployment change at graduation on the research productivity of academics. There
are more PhDs deciding for an academic career if there is a recession at graduation.
Without a specific assumption on the distribution of skills of PhD economists, our
theory does not make a prediction whether the additional academics who enter at
the “extensive margin” are of higher or lower academic skill than the average of those
graduates who always decide to stay in academia after the PhD.
The empirical result in table 2 suggests that on average PhD students of higher
quality decide to stay in academia if the economy is in a state of recession compared
to a state of boom. This is in line with the result already noted in section (4.3) that
34An alternative would be to employ censored quantile regressions. We also only control for
university tier - graduation decade fixed effects and their interactions because the quantile estimation
becomes much less reliable with a large number of dummy controls. The standard errors are not
clustered on the graduation year level as this is not feasible with quantile regressions. However, in
unreported robustness checks we bootstrapped our estimators with and without clustering on the
graduation year level and the significance of our results was largely unaffected.
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it seems to be the individuals at the top of the skill distribution who (are able to
successfully) move between the sectors. The estimated coefficient is significant on the
5% level. An academic graduating on the 90% quantile of unemployment change is
on average 6.67 publication points better than an academic graduating on the 10%
quantile. This is about 13% of the mean of 48.14.
At first glance, the result that academics who experience a recession at gradu-
ation are more successful at publishing than those who experience a boom, seems
to contradict the findings by Paul Oyer (2006). He shows that PhDs who graduate
during a favorable academic job market (which is correlated with economically good
times in general) obtain better initial academic placements. He further shows that
the first placement has a positive causal effect on an economist’s research output by
instrumenting the first placement with the state of the academic job market during
the graduation year.
However, we think that Oyer’s and our result may not contradict each other, but
that they could actually reinforce each other: Suppose that both effects are relevant in
reality - Oyer’s placement effect and our selection effect. On the one hand, we would
underestimate the effect of the business cycle at graduation on the skills selected
into academia. This is because we would not take into account the worse placement
a recession economist experiences on average, which would lower our measure of his
skill, the publication output. Thus, the individuals selected into academia in recession
would actually be better in terms of ex-ante skill than our estimate indicates. On the
other hand, Oyer would underestimate the causal effect of the first placement on the
research output of an economist. This is because he would not take into account the
lower average ex-ante skill of a given economist during boom due to selection.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the effect of aggregate labor market conditions on the ca-
reer choices and research productivity of economics PhDs in the United States. We
document that individuals who applied for- and graduated from the PhD during a re-
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cession produce substantially more research. Moreover, our results on the economists’
career decisions provide strong evidence that the productivity effects arise from a self-
selection into sectors driven by the state of the labor market. Using a Roy-style model
of self-selection into sectors, we provide consolidated findings for the larger debate
about the allocation of talent. For example, we think that it is reasonable to believe
that the same effects that we found for economists should (qualitatively) matter for
the allocation of talent into the financial sector or the teaching profession, too.
Given the severity of last year’s financial crisis and in response, the large extent to
which people flooded graduate schools with applications, our findings suggest that an
exceptionally able selection of students may graduate from these cohorts. Further, we
provide a rationale for countercyclical governmental funding of graduate education
that goes beyond mitigating the adverse impact of recessions on individuals. If it
is the aim to attract more highly able individuals to science and academia, it may
be efficient to specifically target recession cohorts with extra funding and additional
spaces in graduate programs.
References
Angrist, J. D., and J.-S. Pischke (2008): Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An
Empiricist’s Companion. Princeton University Press.
Azoulay, P., J. S. G. Zivin, and J. Wang (2008): “Superstar Extinction,”
Mimeo.
Bedard, K., and D. A. Herman (2008): “Who goes to graduate/professional
school? The importance of economic fluctuations, undergraduate field, and ability,”
Economics of Education Review, 27(2), 197–210.
Bertrand, M. (2009): “CEOs,” Annual Review of Economics, 1(1), 121–150.
Bolton, P., T. Santos, and J. A. Scheinkman (2010): “Is the Financial Sector
too Big?,” Mimeo.
27
Ellison, G. (2002a): “Evolving Standards for Academic Publishing: A q-r Theory,”
Journal of Political Economy, 110(5), 994–1034.
(2002b): “The Slowdown of the Economics Publishing Process,” Journal of
Political Economy, 110(5), 947–993.
(2007): “Is Peer Review in Decline?,” NBER working paper.
Fougere, D., and J. Pouget (2003): “Who Wants to Be a ŚFonctionnaireŠ? The
Effects of Individual Wage Differentials and Unemployment Probabilities on the
Queues for Public Sector Jobs,” Mimeo.
Freeman, R. B., and J. van Reenen (2009): “What if Congress Doubled R&D
Spending on the Physical Sciences?,” Mimeo.
Goolsbee, A. (1998): “Does Government R&D Policy Mainly Benefit Scientists
and Engineers?,” The American Economic Review, 88(2), 298–302.
Hansen, W. L. (1991): “The Education and Training of Economics Doctorates:
Major Findings of the Executive Secretary of the American Economic Associa-
tion’s Commission on Graduate Education in Economics,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 29(3), 1054–1087.
Hasselback, J. (2001): “US Faculty Directories for Economics, Finance and Man-
agement,” last accessed 2010-10-25, CET 3:58 pm.
Heckman, J. J., and B. E. Honoré (1990): “The Empirical Content of the Roy
Model,” Econometrica, 58(5), pp. 1121–1149.
Kahn, L. B. (2010): “The long-term labor market consequences of graduating from
college in a bad economy,” Labour Economics, 17(2), 303–316.
Kalaitzidakis, P., T. P. Mamuneas, and T. Stengos (2003): “Rankings of
Academic Journals and Institutions in Economics,” Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association, 1(6), 1346–1366.
28
Keane, M., and K. Wolpin (1997): “The Career Decisions of Young Men,” Journal
of Political Economy, 105(3), 473–522.
Kim, E. H., A. Morse, and L. Zingales (2006): “What Has Mattered to Eco-
nomics since 1970,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(4), 189–202.
Kondo, A. (2008): “Differential Effects of Graduating during Recessions across Race
and Gender,” Mimeo.
Laband, D. N., and M. J. Piette (1994): “The Relative Impacts of Economics
Journals: 1970-1990,” Journal of Economic Literature, 32(2), 640–666.
Lee, D., and K. I. Wolpin (2006): “Intersectoral Labor Mobility and the Growth
of the Service Sector,” Econometrica, 74(1), 1–46.
Nickell, S., and G. Quintini (2002): “The Consequences of The Decline in Public
Sector Pay in Britain: A Little Bit of Evidence,” Economic Journal, 112(477),
F107–F118.
Oreopoulos, P., T. v. Wachter, and A. Heisz (2008): “The Short- and Long-
Term Career Effects of Graduating in a Recession: Hysteresis and Heterogeneity
in the Market for College Graduates,” Mimeo.
Oyer, P. (2006): “Initial Labor Market Conditions and Long-Term Outcomes for
Economists,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(3), 143-160.
(2008): “The Making of an Investment Banker: Stock Market Shocks, Career
Choice, and Lifetime Income,” The Journal of Finance, 63(6), 2601–2628.
Philippon, T., and A. Reshef (2009): “Wages and Human Capital in the U.S.
Financial Industry: 1909-2006,” revise American Economic Review.
Roy, A. D. (1951): “SOME THOUGHTS ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF EARN-
INGS,” Oxford Economic Papers, 3(2), 135–146.
Stock, W. A., and J. J. Siegfried (2006): “Time-to-Degree for the Economics
Ph.D. Class of 2001-2002,” The American Economic Review, 96(2), 467–474.
29
Sullivan, D., and T. von Wachter (2009): “Job Displacement and Mortality:
An Analysis Using Administrative Data,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
124(3), 1265–1306.
von Wachter, T., J. Song, and J. Manchester (2008): “Long-Term Earn-
ings Losses due to Job Separation During the 1982 Recession: An Analysis Using
Longitudinal Administrative Data from 1974 to 2004,” Mimeo.
Waldinger, F. (2009): “Peer Effects in Science - Evidence from the Dismissal of
Scientists in Nazi Germany,” Mimeo.
Appendices
A Formal Results and Proofs
To simplify the notation in the proves, we denote the population distribution of the
pre-selection skill F (α, β) with α, β > 0 and the distribution of the post-selection skill
as Gs(α, β) where s indicates the state of the business cycle at the time of selection.
The associated density functions are denoted f(α, β) and gs(α, β), respectively. To
simplify the exposition, we compare a typical boom (s = Boom, high y) with a
recession (s = Rec, low y) and assume that there is some strictly positive probability
mass at every point of the pre-selection skill distribution, i.e. f(α, β) > 0 for all α, β.
At every selection point in time, only the N individuals with the highest α applying
for academia are admitted. We denote by αs the individual with the lowest α that
will still get into academia when the state of the business cycle is s. Further, we
define β(α, s) to be the business skill β for which an individual of academic skill α
is indifferent between the two sectors when the state of the business cycle is s, i.e.
β(α, s) is such that α = β(α, s) + ys.
In order to facilitate the proofs in the following, we do two more things. We
first show (by contradiction) that the cut-off value αs is higher in recession than
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in boom. This means that the least able (in terms of academic skills) individual
admitted into academia in a recession is academically more able than the least able
individual admitted in a boom.
Lemma A.1 αBoom < αRec.
Proof of lemma A.1: Suppose not. We know from the individual’s optimal decision
that for all α, the β at which they are indifferent between both sectors is higher for
a recession individual, i.e. β(α,Rec) = α − yRec > β(α,Boom) = α − yBoom. Filling
all spaces in academia further requires that for all y and s
∫ ∞
α
∫ β(α,s)
0
f(u1, u2)du1du2 = N.
If αBoom ≥ αRec and β(α,Rec) > β(α,Boom), then this implies
∫ ∞
αBoom
∫ β(α,Boom)
0
f(u1, u2)du1du2 <
∫ ∞
αRec
∫ β(α,Rec)
0
f(u1, u2)du1du2.
Contradiction.
Secondly, we define the following sets:
• C = {(α, β)|αRec ≤ α, α > β + yBoom} is the group of individuals who always
enter the PhD. Within this group, c(α˜, β˜) is the subset of individuals for whom
also α < α˜ and β < β˜ while C(ygrad) is the subset of individuals for whom also
α > β + ygrad.
• A = {(α, β)|αBoom ≤ α < αRec, α > β + yBoom} is the group of individuals
who always want to enter the PhD but only get admitted in boom. Within
this group, a(α˜, β˜) is the subset of individuals for whom also α < α˜ and β < β˜
while A(ygrad) is the subset of individuals for whom also α > β + ygrad.
• B = {(α, β)|αRec ≤ α, β + yRec < α ≤ β + yBoom} is the group of individuals
who only prefer to do a PhD during recession and in this case replace A. Within
this group, b(α˜, β˜) is the subset of individuals for whom also α < α˜ and β < β˜
while B(ygrad) is the subset of individuals for whom also α > β + ygrad.
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Looking at an example in figure ?? [INSERT FIGURE ABOUT HERE], we see
that C(ygrad), A(ygrad) and B(ygrad) are the elements of C, A and B which lie to
the left of the dashed ygrad line. Thus, in the case depicted, those are C and A as
well as B1. c(α, β(α, ygrad)), a(α, β(α, ygrad)) and b(α, β(α, ygrad)) are the elements
of C, A and B which lie to the left of the dashed ygrad line and below the academic
ability α. Hence, c(α, β(α, ygrad)), a(α, β(α, ygrad)) and b(α, β(α, ygrad)) are always
(weakly) smaller than C(ygrad), A(ygrad) and B(ygrad), respectively. Finally, note that
|C|+ |A| = |C|+ |B| = N .
Proposition 2.1 describes the effect of the selection into sectors under quantity
constraints.
Proof of proposition 2.1: Formally, the proposition states that GRec(α, β) ≤
GBoom(α, β) for all (α, β) ∈ R and that there exists at least one (α, β) ∈ R such
that GRec(α, β) < GBoom(α, β). Distinguish two cases:
• Consider any (α, β) s.t. α < αRec. In this case, GBoom > 0 for (α, β)A while
GRec = 0 for all (α, β).
• Conversely, consider any (α, β) s.t. α ≥ αRec. We see that GBoom(α, β) =
|a(α,β)|+|c(α,β)|
N
and that GRec(α, β) = |b(α,β)|+|c(α,β)|
N
. If β ≤ β(α, yBoom) we have
b(α, β) = 0 and a(α, β) ≥ 0 and if β > β(α, yBoom) we have a(α, β) = |A| ≥
b(α, β). Thus, GRec ≤ GBoom for all (α, β) where α ≥ αRec.
Proof of proposition 2.2: We distinguish three cases in terms of the business cycle
at graduation and we show that in every case weakly (and in one case strictly) more
individuals of the “recession at graduation” cohort leave after the PhD.
1. Suppose that ygrad ≤ yRec: everyone of the sets A, B and C will prefer to stay
in academia in this case.
2. Suppose that yRec < ygrad ≤ yBoom: none of the members of the sets A and C
will leave while some of the B will leave - namely those for whom β + yRec <
α ≤ β + ygrad.
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3. Suppose that ygrad > yBoom: everyone from the set B will leave academia and a
subset of A and C will leave, namely those for whom β+yBoom < α ≤ β+ygrad.
Weakly more of the recession cohort thus leave in this case as B is greater than
a subset of A.
Therefore, members of a recession cohort are more likely to leave and, on expectation
over all possible realizations of the business cycle at graduation, strictly more of
members of a “recession at application” cohort will leave after the PhD.
Proof of proposition 2.3: Define Hs(α, β) as the joint distribution of skills and
HsP (α) as the partial distribution of skills after individuals left academia or stayed
on after the PhD (the “post-graduation” joint- and partial distribution). Distinguish
three cases again.
1. Suppose that ygrad ≤ yRec: as nobody of either cohorts leaves, FSD of GRec over
GBoom carries over to HRec FSD HBoom.
2. Suppose that yRec < ygrad ≤ yBoom and consider two subcases:
• if α < αRec, HBoom > 0 for (α, β)A while HRec = 0 for all (α, β).
• conversely, if α ≥ αRec we see that HBoom(α, β) = |a(α,β)|+|c(α,β)||A|+|C| and
that HRec(α, β) = |b(α,min{β,β(α,ygrad)})|+|c(α,β)||B(ygrad)|+|C| . If β ≤ β(α, yBoom) we have
the counterexample why the joint distribution FSD doesn’t feed through.
b(α,min{β, β(α, ygrad)}) = 0, but |A| > |B(ygrad)| and we can imagine skill
distributions and points (α, β) where |a(α, β)| is very small (or converges to
zero). Then HRec(α, β) > HBoom(α, β). However, the partial distribution
for academic skills does work for all α: HBoomP (α) =
|A|+|c(α,β(α,yBoom))|
|A|+|C| >
HRecP (α) =
|b(α,β(α,yRec))|+|c(α,β(α,yBoom))|
|B(ygrad)|+|C| because |b(α, β(α, yRec))| ≤ |B(ygrad)| <
|A|.
3. Suppose that ygrad > yBoom. For the same reasons as in the previous case,
the FSD result for the joint skill distribution doesn’t hold here and thus we
consider the partial distribution for academic skills right away. Distinguish two
cases again:
33
• if α < αRec, HBoomP > 0 for α ≥ αBoom while HRecP = 0 always.
• conversely, if α ≥ αRec, we see that HBoomP = |A(ygrad)|+|c(α,β(α,y
grad))|
|A(ygrad)|+|C(ygrad)| ≥
HRecP =
|c(α,β(α,ygrad))|
|C(ygrad)| .
We have shown that for every realization of the business cycle at graduation and the
according types of PhDs who stay in academia and who leave, the partial distribution
of academic skills of the “recession at application” cohort FSD its counterpart from
the “boom at application” cohort.
B Data Collection and Processing
This section explains in detail the data collection and processing procedure. Specifi-
cally, we discuss how the sample of economists and their background variables were
acquired and how we computed a measure of publication success. An overview of the
data sources is given in table 5.
All employed programs are available on request from the authors.
B.1 Database for Economics PhD Graduates
To construct our sample of economists, we downloaded the PDF version of all issues of
the American Economics Associations (AEA) yearly “List of Doctoral Dissertations
in Economics” from the JSTOR, an online journal repository from 1950 to 2006. The
list was published in the Papers and Proceedings issue of the “American Economic
Review” until 1986 and in the “Journal of Economic Literature” thereafter. The
AEA “List of Doctoral Dissertations in Economics” specifies doctoral degrees con-
ferred by U.S. and Canadian universities for every year since 1906. The name of the
degree recipients and the year of graduation is provided to the American Economic
Association by each degree granting university.
To convert the available PDF version of the AEA doctoral list into a text file, we
used the optical character recognition (OCR) program included in the Adobe Acrobat
8 Professional Suite. The quality of the Adobe technology was best compared to
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Variable Description Source
Personal information of
graduates
Name, University and Gradu-
ation year
AEA “List of Doctoral Disser-
tations in Economics” of 1955
to 2004
Faculty membership Faculty directory of (mainly
American) Economics, Busi-
ness and Finance departments
by John R. Hasselback
www.facultydirectories.
com/
Membership in the
AEA
Membership data of the
American Economic Asso-
ciation in 1970, 1974, 1981,
1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2003
and 2007
Supplement to the Papers and
Proceedings Issue in the re-
spective year digitalized by
JSTOR
University ranking Tier of a university accord-
ing to the National Research
Council
www.vanderbilt.edu/AEA/
gradstudents/
Publication records Publications in 74 journals
listed in the JSTOR online
repository, from 1955 to 2004
dfr.jstor.org/
Journal rankings Citation ranking of journals in
Economics, Business and Fi-
nance from 1950 to 2000
Laband and Piette (1994),
Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas,
and Stengos (2003), Kim,
Morse, and Zingales (2006)
and ideas.repec.org/
Value of the outside op-
tion
seasonally adjusted change
in unemployment or GDP
growth from 1949 to 1994
Thomson Reuters Datastream
Duration of the PhD Median years between regis-
tration and graduation from
the PhD for 1977, 1986, 1996,
1997, 2001
National Science Foundation,
Stock and Siegfried (2006),
Hansen (1991)
Table 5: Data sources
35
other programs we have tried. This read-in procedure worked well in general and it
accelerated the compilation of the dataset but, as every automated procedure, it also
entailed several problems and imperfections. In some cases the original PDFs were
scans of old printed versions and, therefore, due to the quality of the source files, the
character recognition of some records was erroneous.
Particularly, there were problems with the letter “r”, which was mistaken as “n”
or “i” from time to time. “O” was sometimes read as zero, “H” as “II”, and “M”
as “IVI”. Also, dots sometimes were not readily recognized. We were able to correct
faulty university names and graduation years because the set of those is finite. For
example, we always replaced “IVIichigan” by “Michigan”. Due to limited resources,
we were not able to correct all errors in the name spellings. We decided to drop
observations with names that contain characters or sequences of characters that are
highly unlikely to be correct and thus had no chance to return accurate results in a
query for publications in JSTOR.
In a next step we used regular expressions, a way to assign database fields for
some string combinations, to convert the text file into a database format. The data
structure of the AEA doctoral list is quite regular so this procedure worked rea-
sonably well. On some instances, the employed regular expression was not able to
determine the end of a data entry due to missing dots. However, this did not happen
systematically.
As mentioned above, the read-in procedure delivered some faulty results. We
believe that all these errors are orthogonal to our effect of interest and that they thus
just add noise to our data. Nevertheless we want to test how many read in names
are faulty: To do this, we first correct some years (perfectly) by hand and compare
the resulting “complete” graduation numbers to graduation numbers published by the
National Science Foundation (NSF). We find that the “complete” graduation numbers
from the AEA list are about 90% of the NSF graduation numbers. Then, for every
year, we compare the fraction of the “not corrected” number in our database to the
number in the NSF data. This fraction fluctuates from 0.6 to 0.9, which suggests that
in the worst case we lose about 40% of graduates due to the imperfect automated
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read-in procedure.
In the next step we supplemented the information with the respective tier of the
degree granting university according to the National Research Council. The National
Research Council rankings of economics graduate programs divide programs into
tiers.
We dropped all graduates from universities not represented in this NRC ranking
because we are not sure if the application process and research environment in these
institutions are comparable to the universities in the first three tiers. In order to en-
sure robustness we also considered the Top 30 US universities according to the Econ-
PhD.net ranking (as in Oyer 2006), which yielded the same results. The EconPhd.net
ranking is available online on http://econphd.econwiki.com/rankings.htm.
B.2 Indicator for Being an Academic
To complete the person-specific background variables, we add an indicator if a PhD
graduate became an “academic” later on. We define “academics” according to the
three concepts explained in section 4.3 - those who are faculty members, those who
are faculty members or AEA members, and those who publish at least one ranked
article. While the last concept derives from our publication measure explained in the
next subsection, the data collection for the first two measures is described here.
Data about faculty membership in US economics, business or finance departments
is acquired from the webpage of James R. Hasselback from the University of West
Florida who regularly compiles U.S. faculty directories.35 Unfortunately, there is no
comprehensive database about faculty members of non-US universities, researchers in
other US university departments, like law and agriculture, and academics in institu-
tions other than universities, e.g. World Bank researchers. To construct a proxy for
belonging to these groups, we analyze the membership records of American Economic
Association. We think that the likelihood of being an AEA member is higher, if the
graduate decided to become a member of the academic community.36
35http://www.facultydirectories.com/
36Specifically, we take the AEA directory of members in 1970, 1974, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997,
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The faculty listings and the AEA membership directories are only available as
PDF. Therefore, we again use the Adobe OCR program and regular expressions to
translate them into a database file. We use Apache Lucene, an information retrieval
library, to match the data on graduates with the faculty listing and the AEA mem-
bership. This is necessary because some students drop their second name over the
years or abbreviate it. As is common for search engines, Lucene employs a scoring
algorithm based on the similarity of the name of the graduate and the name in the
documents.37 For the faculty directory (and a sample of the AEA members), we
checked the matches found by hand to ensure accuracy.
B.3 Publications
After compiling the database of graduates, we used a program to match each entry
with its publication record in JSTOR. To do this, we use the newly available XML
application programming interface of JSTOR, called “Data for Research” (DfR).38
Specifically, we entered the names and given names of all researchers contained in our
database and extracted all recorded publications with journal title, number of pages
and the number and identity of coauthors in the first 10 years after their graduation.
To be as specific as possible, we restricted our search to articles classified as “research
articles” published in English language in the fields of economics, business and finance.
The restriction to articles published ten years after graduation (as in Oyer 2006),
has three reasons: First, it improves the specificity of the data processing, because
economists with the same name who were born in different decades are not merged
but kept as different persons. Second, the quality of an economist is arguably best
revealed in the first decade after PhD graduation. Academic researchers are highly
motivated (incentivized) in this period because their tenure decision depends on the
publication record of these first years. Finally, graduates from more recent years
2003 and 2007.
37For a discussion of the algorithm http://lucene.apache.org/java/2_4_0/api/org/apache/
lucene/search/Similarity.html.
38JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/) is a leading repository for archiving academic journals which
contains (in July 2010) around 3.1 Million research articles for all sciences with the first article
published in 1545. The DfR interface is found under http://dfr.jstor.org/.
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would be disadvantaged if we did not restrict the time frame. Currently JSTOR
provides full publication data up to the year 2004, so the last individuals we can
rightfully analyze following our ten year requirement are those who graduated in
1994.
B.4 Ranking Methods and Interpretation of the Productiv-
ity Measure
To measure the productivity of each individual on an ordinal scale, we have to value
each publication in the record. This poses three challenges: First, the relative weight
of an article in a certain journal compared to an article in another journal is a constant
matter of discussion in the profession. Second, comparing the value of publications
over the decades is difficult because the relative impact of economics journals has
changed substantially over time ( Kim, Morse, and Zingales 2006). Third, by sum-
ming up the contributions of different publications over ten years the resulting number
becomes hard to interpret. We adress these challenges by showing the robustness of
our result for several ranking methodologies with different strengths and weaknesses
below.
Our preferred method is a citation ranking based on the methodology of Laband
and Piette (1994). The authors of this study use the citations to articles in a particular
journal (excluding self-citations) as a measure of its quality or impact. Their paper
presents the journal impact factors from the 1960s to the 1980s, while Kalaitzidakis,
Mamuneas, and Stengos (2003) use the same method for the 1990s and the recursive
discounted ranking on the ideas.org ranking page delivers us the impact factors for
the 2000s.39 For the 1950s we were not able to find a journal ranking and thus decided
to extrapolate our 1960s ranking back to articles published in the 1950s. In total, we
collect impact factors of 74 ranked journals in economics, business and finance for
five decades. Table 6 provides an overview of the dynamic ranking of the top forty
39http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.rdiscount.html. Note, that this ranking is up-
dated continuously and thus its online version at the time of reading is not exactly the same as the
one we use.
39
journals used in this study.
The outcome measure in table 6 is denominated in publication points. The best
journal in each decade receives 100 points and all others are scaled accordingly. For
example, in the 1960s, a single-authored Econometrica article is worth 46.6 points
while it is worth 96.8 points in the 1990s. The impact of the American Economic
Review (AER) changed even more dramatically: It has been the leading journal in the
1960s and 1990s with 93.3 and 100 respectively. In contrast, in the 1970s, 1980s and
2000s it was “only” a top tier journal with 30-40 publication points. Consequently,
when trying to interpret our results above in terms of actual papers, we need to
mention the journal and the decade (e.g. “one third of an AER article in the 1990s”).
Reassuringly, we show in section E.3 that our results are extremely robust to using
several other intuitive productivity measures: publication points assigned according
to the currently very popular h-index, raw counts of articles written, and, most
notably, counts of articles in the five top economics journals (as in Oyer 2006) plus
the Journal of Finance.
B.5 Imputing the PhD Entry Date
As mentioned in section 3.3, we have to impute the approximate application date to
the PhD.
According to table 7, the median duration of a PhD stayed almost constant around
five to six years since the 1970s. We therefore subtract six years from the graduation
date and then use the change in unemployment during the preceding year as an
indicator for the state of the macroeconomy at application.
For example, if a hypothetical graduate student obtained his doctorate in 2009,
he is likely to have started the program either in August 2003 or August 2004 and
must have applied either in the fall of 2002 or 2003. Consequently, we proxy the
change in the outside option at application for a student who graduates in 2009 with
the change in the unemployment rate from summer 2002 to summer 2003.40
40Of course, we cannot be sure that the median number of years is a good measure for the duration
of the PhD for the considered graduate. There is micro data on the duration available with the
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Rank Journal (ordered by 2000 rank) 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
1 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 65.6 16.2 41.6 58.1 100
2 Econometrica 46.6 31.6 78.4 96.8 68.7
3 Journal of Economic Literature - 100 100 18.8 63.5
4 The Review of Economic Studies 100 30.7 40.7 45.2 54.3
5 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity - 96.9 15.9 0.7 51.5
6 The Journal of Political Economy 63.5 59.1 63 65.2 49.8
7 Economic Policy - - - - 45.7
8 Journal of Labor Economics - - 15.4 12.8 45.5
9 The American Economic Review 93.3 34.5 40.2 100 39.9
10 The Journal of Economic Perspectives - - 23.3 34.3 39.8
11 The Review of Financial Studies - - - - 39.2
12 Journal of the European Economic Association - - - - 38.6
13 The RAND Journal of Economics (Bell Journal
of Economics)
- 39.5 40.2 11.4 38.2
14 The Journal of Finance 37.8 14.6 34.1 34.1 31.1
15 The Review of Economics and Statistics 59.8 12.4 6.5 28 21.7
16 Journal of Business & Economic Statistics - - 7.9 38.4 20.8
17 The Economic Journal 47.5 28 23.9 20.7 20.5
18 Journal of Applied Econometrics - - - 16.6 19.1
19 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 18.5 22.1 18.6 18.6
20 The World Bank Economic Review - - - 5.7 18.5
21 International Economic Review 35.1 19 12.3 23 18.4
22 IMF Staff Papers - - - 5.1 18.3
23 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization - - - 4.1 16.1
24 Journal of Law and Economics 51.8 43.3 33.1 3.9 14.1
25 The Journal of Human Resources - 13.6 4.6 21.3 13.4
26 Journal of Population Economics - - - 2.41 10.6
27 The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2.5 7.1 2.1 10.7 9.2
28 The Journal of Business 18.5 37.4 8.7 8.7
29 The Journal of Industrial Economics 14.9 16.4 16 3.85 8.7
30 The World Bank Research Observer - - - 0.9 8.5
31 The Journal of Financial and Quant. Analysis - 10.8 20 2.1 7.9
32 Oxford Economic Papers 35.2 16.8 25 3.7 7.9
33 Economica 20.7 36.2 4.1 4.5 7.2
34 Economic Theory - - - 22.4 6.8
35 Industrial and Labor Relations Review 17 18.8 23.4 - 6.1
36 Econometric Theory - - 3.3 45.8 5.9
37 The Canadian Journal of Economics - 11.8 10.2 5.09 5.6
38 The Journal of Legal Studies - - 51.6 5.4 5.4
39 Financial Management - - - - 5.1
40 Journal of Accounting Research - - - - 4.2
Note: These are the first 40 out of 74 journals. The rankings for the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s are
taken from Laband and Piette (1994) and the ranking for the 1990s is from Kalaitzidakis,
Mamuneas, and Stengos (2003). For the 2000s, we normalize the current discounted recursive
impact factors ranking from the IDEAS RePEc website
(http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.rdiscount.html) to make it comparable to the
other rankings.
Table 6: Ranking of journals in different decades.
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Year 1977 1986 1996 1997 2001
5.7 6.3 5.3 5.25 5.5
Median years
of registered
time to PhD
Median years
of registered
time to PhD
Time
to degree
median time-
to-degree
Time
to degree
Source Hansen
(1991)
Hansen
(1991)
NSF* Stock and
Siegfried
(2006)
NSF*
*NSF duration data includes masters degrees, therefore we subtract 1.5 years
Table 7: Duration of a PhD
C The Relationship Between (Potentially) Con-
founding Factors and the Business Cycle
This section addresses potential concerns about factors that might confound our
results and analyzes possible impacts on our estimates. In the following we address
concerns about the size of the entry and exit cohort, the attrition rate and the timing
of graduation. Lastly, we adress a potential correlation of the business cycle at
application and graduation.
In order to do this, we calculate the number of graduates from our dataset (in the
following listed as “# of graduates (AEA)”) and match it with the unemployment
change at application and at graduation. Then, we supplement this data with data
from the National Science Foundation’s “Survey of Earned Doctorates”.41 From there
we obtain the the number of PhD entrants and graduates for our top 30 universities
since 1977. Using this data, we are able to estimate the attrition (dropout) rate of
each cohort as the difference of the number of entrants minus graduates divided by
the number of entrants. We aggregate the data to year levels to obtain the correct
standard errors with regard to unemployment change in 8. We report the partial
correlation coefficient of unemployment change at application and at graduation with
application and graduation numbers in table 8. In order to obtain the correct standard
errors we aggregate the data to yearly averages.
National Science Foundation Survey of earned doctorates but access is limited to on site use.
41This survey is publicly available through the WebCaspar Interface https://webcaspar.nsf.
gov/
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The first concern one might have is that the number of students admitted to
the PhD systematically increases (decreases) in recessions. Within the framework of
our model, this would weaken (strengthen) the selection effect at application. The
estimated coefficient of unemployment change at application might then be under-
estimated (overestimated). According to table 8, we cannot reject that the relation
of the number of entrants to the PhD and the change in unemployment differs from
zero on conventional significance levels (p-value of 67.5%).
Second, one might be concerned that the attrition (or dropout) rate during the
program may systematically differ between recession and boom cohorts. On the one
hand, some business-inclined individuals who entered the PhD in order to bridge a
recession might return to the private sector before they actually obtain the PhD. If
this were the case, we would underestimate the effect of unemployment change at
application on economists’ career decision after the PhD (the “academic” variable).
The reason is that many of those who would want to switch would have already
done so before we consider them in our population of graduates. On the other hand,
there might be a higher dropout rate for the boom cohort because its individuals
are of lower academic quality. In this case, our parameters would underestimate the
effect of unemployment change at application on the performance of graduates and
academics. According to the correlation table 8, our estimate of the attrition rate is
not significantly correlated with unemployment change at application or graduation.
Third, PhDs might time their graduation in order to circumvent entering the
private or the academic job market during a time of recession.42 The effect of such
a graduation timing on our parameter estimates would depend on whether the high-
or the low skilled bring their graduation date forward (or delay it). For example,
if in a recession students with low academic talent delay their end of the PhD, we
overestimate the effect on productivity at graduation, but underestimate the effect
on becoming an academic. This would attenuate our effect of the business cycle on
productivity at application. Table 8 reports the correlation of graduation numbers
and unemployment change according to the NSF data and the AEA doctoral listings,
42Oyer (2006) documents that also academic job offers decline during recession.
44
respectively. Reassuringly, graduation numbers seem not to be at all related to the
state of the business cycle.
Finally, a last concern might be that, contrary to our assumption in the model,
the business cycle is systematically correlated with itself in the six years between
a cohort’s application and graduation. Table 9 reports this and the contemporane-
ous correlation between the unemployment change and GDP growth. Unsurprisingly
both measures are strongly contemporaneously related. However, there is no sig-
nificant correlation, neither of unemployment change nor GDP change, between the
time of application and graduation. If at all, there may be a very slightly reversing
relationship over the six years. This could imply that we potentially underestimate
the effect of the business cycle on academic performance because a recession cohort
at graduation is more likely a boom cohort at application (and thus is inherently not
as able) and vice versa for a boom cohort at graduation. For the same reason we
might in this case overestimate the effect of the business cycle on the career decision
(i.e. the academic variable) at application and at graduation.
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D Supporting Evidence for the Selection Channel
In the theory section of the main text, we hypothesize that during downturns more
individuals want to enter academia and, due to a fixed number of open spaces at
entry to the PhD, only a favorable selection with superior ability is admitted. Unfor-
tunately, however, we see ourselves unable to provide direct evidence for the selection
mechanism at work. This is for the following reason:
In order to gather evidence, we were looking for data that provides observable
ex ante characteristics of the students admitted to the PhD programs which we
could then relate to the state of the business cycle. We obtained Graduate Record
Examination (GRE) scores for a non-US PhD program that is comparable to a tier
two school. The GRE consists of three sections: quantitative, verbal and analytical
writing. In all universities, GRE scores are considered an obligatory part of the
application documents and it is generally agreed that it is almost exclusively the
quantitative section that matters for admission. For this reason, our GRE scores
proved to be uninformative. We found that, independently of the state of the business
cycle, virtually everyone accepted to the PhD as well as most applicants had the
highest possible mark (800 points) in the quantitative section.
In general, we are very skeptical that easily observable ex ante characteristics, such
as GRE data or undergraduate GPAs, of applicants or entrants would be informative
about the selection into the programs because many successful and unsuccessful ap-
plicants do not differ in these dimensions. The truly informative quality differences
of applicants and entrants are most likely to be more subtly hidden in “softer” infor-
mation such as reference letters, research assistantships and types of courses taken
during the undergraduate degree. This kind of information is very hard to obtain
and to process in an objective way.
Although we are unable to present direct evidence for our hypothesized channel,
Kelly Bedard and Douglas Herman published a study in the Economics of Education
Review (2008) that documents supporting evidence for our main selection channel.
They use data on recently graduated science and engineering Bachelor and Master
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students from 1990 to 2000 which is provided in the 1993 to 2001 National Sur-
vey of Recent College Graduates (NSRCG). Exploiting the variation in state-level
unemployment rates, Bedard and Herman find that male PhD enrollment is counter-
cyclical and the counter-cyclicality is driven by students with a high GPA in the
hard sciences.43 They state that the unemployment rate responses for this group
are fairly precisely estimated and that their estimates imply a one-percentage point
increase in the unemployment rate increases “high GPA” male Ph.D. enrollment by
0.356 percentage points.
In another paper, Fougere and Pouget (2003) find that the applications per spaces
ratio in the French public sector rises strongly in economically hard times. Unfortu-
nately they do not provide a quality measure of French public sector workers. c
E Robustness Checks
In this section we estimate different variants of our main empirical model in order to
scrutinize the robustness of the results.
We restate our main findings in table 10: A recession at application leads to a
more productive selection of academics (column 3). The propensity to become an
academic is decreasing with unemployment change at application and increasing with
unemployment change at graduation (column 2). Cohorts graduating in a recession
are publishing more (column 1). In the following we consider GDP growth as an
alternative measure for the business cycle, time trends as control variables instead of
decade dummies, several measures for productivity and different assumed durations
for the PhD. We also consider subsamples of our data by only looking at graduates
from the elite tier one institutions and by removing “superstar” economists who are
exceptionally prolific.
43They look at entry into all PhD programs in terms of quality and subject and not our only
the top 30 economics programs. Therefore, quantity constraints in terms of entry should matter
much less and it is not surprising that they not only find the expected quality differences in terms
of entrants with respect to the business cycle, but also quantity differences. Moreover, it is also not
surprising that GPAs matter (more strongly) for engineering and science majors and for a broader
range of graduate schools than just the top 30 departments.
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Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 1.540∗∗ -0.891 3.274∗∗∗
(0.661) (0.576) (0.945)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.312∗∗∗ 1.354∗∗ 2.738∗∗
(0.645) (0.607) (1.199)
Subsample All All Academic
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 10: Main regression results
E.1 Alternative Measures for the Business Cycle and Con-
trols for the Time Trend
Productivity Academic Productivity
GDP Change (Application) -0.658∗∗ 0.472∗ -1.456∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.245) (0.421)
GDP Change (Graduation) -0.705∗∗ -0.407 -0.739
(0.326) (0.273) (0.557)
Subsample All All Academic
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 11: Alternative business cycle measures: GDP change
Academic Faculty Publish Academic
GDP Change (Application) 0.472∗ 0.248 0.448∗∗ 0.750∗∗
(0.245) (0.194) (0.189) (0.287)
GDP Change (Graduation) -0.407 -0.047 0.051 -1.247∗∗∗
(0.273) (0.193) (0.229) (0.361)
Subsample All All All Tier 1
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1068 234
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 12: Alternative business cycle measures: GDP change
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We repeat our main specification with GDP growth as a measure for the business
cycle in table 11.44 Note that an increase in GDP indicates a boom and a decrease
a recession. Therefore, the sign of the coefficients are reversed. The results on
productivity hold up very well: the effect of unemployment change at application
on the productivity of academics as well as the effect of unemployment change at
graduation are not only significant but also in the direction that theory predicts.
The direction of the coefficients is also correct in the regression on the propensity to
become an academic. The effect is significant on the 10% level at application, but
insignificant at graduation. In table 12, regressions on alternative interpretations of
being an academic are reported and the picture stays the same.
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 1.873∗∗ -0.942∗ 3.555∗∗∗
(0.723) (0.534) (1.013)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 1.551∗∗ 0.635 1.736
(0.649) (0.582) (1.169)
Subsample All All Academic
Time trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 13: Alternative controls: linear and quadratic time trend
Academic Faculty Publish Academic
Unempl Change (Application) -0.942∗ -0.083 -0.501 -1.214∗
(0.534) (0.393) (0.318) (0.637)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 0.635 0.025 0.044 1.493
(0.582) (0.418) (0.460) (0.905)
Subsample All All All Tier 1
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047 232
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 14: Alternative controls: linear and quadratic time trend
44The growth of GDP might well proxy for a (potential) economist’s earnings potential in outside
employment with performance pay such as the financial sector.
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Another concern might be that our graduation decade dummies inadequately
control for the general trends in academia over time. In table 13 we therefore report
the main regression with university dummies and a linear and quadratic time trend
instead. The results of the main section on productivity are largely robust. Only the
productivity of academics at graduation is not significant anymore, but theory made
no prediction for the sign of this parameter in the first place. The results on the
propensity to become an academic have the right sign and at application they are
significant at the 10% level. The picture stays the same if we use different measures
for being an academic in table 14.
E.2 Alternative Measures for Being an Academic
In the main text, we report three different measures which might indicate that an
individual is an academic: Our standard “academic” measure equals one if he is a
faculty member or a member of the American Economic Association after graduation
from the PhD. The second measure is one if the PhD student becomes a faculty
member at a US business, economics or finance department and the third one shows
if the student is able to publish in one of our ranked journals after graduation. In
the main text, due to conciseness, we left out the robustness of our productivity
regressions of academics with regard to the last two measures. In table 15, we report
this robustness check for completeness. All coefficients have the correct sign and all
are significant at conventional levels (except the unemployment change at graduation
for the faculty measure).
E.3 Alternative Measures for Productivity
One might be concerned that our dynamic productivity measure does not properly
capture the actual achievements of an academic. We consider three alternative mea-
sures of academic productivity in tables 16 and 17: the number of top journal articles,
the h-value and the raw number of articles. We classify articles in the “Economet-
rica”, “The American Economic Review”, “The Quarterly Journal of Economics”,
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Productivity Productivity Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 3.274∗∗∗ 6.837∗∗∗ 5.630∗∗∗
(0.945) (2.471) (1.291)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.738∗∗ 2.353 4.352∗∗∗
(1.199) (1.868) (1.094)
Subsample Academic Faculty Publish
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1047 906 974
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 15: Alternative measure for being academic: Productivity
“The Review of Economic Studies”, “The Journal of Political Economy” and “The
Journal of Finance” as top journal articles. The h-index (Hirsch index or Hirsch num-
ber) is a currently very popular measure based on citations and number of articles.
An economist has index h if h of his N papers have at least h citations each, and
the other N - h papers have at most h citations each. The last measure is the raw
number of articles written as recorded in JSTOR.
Top Journals h-index # of Articles
Unempl Change (Application) 0.016 1.172 0.012
(0.010) (1.110) (0.032)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 0.040∗∗∗ 3.980∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.009) (0.869) (0.022)
Subsample All All All
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1068
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 16: Alternative productivity measures - Full sample
All results in tables 16 and 17 point in the same direction as the dynamic per-
formance measure in the main text and as the selection theory predicts. Out of the
effects predicted by the theory, only the effect of the unemployment change at appli-
cation on the number of articles of academics is not significant. Thus, our results are
extremely robust to the use of different productivity measures.
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Top Journals h-index # of Articles
Unempl Change (Application) 0.035∗∗ 3.161∗∗ 0.057
(0.014) (1.558) (0.047)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 0.050∗∗∗ 4.838∗∗∗ 0.047
(0.014) (1.552) (0.044)
Subsample Academic Academic Academic
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1047 1047 1047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 17: Alternative productivity measures - Academics
E.4 Alternative Duration of the PhD
We explain in our data section that we impute the application date by subtracting six
years from the graduation date. The rationale for the difference of 6 years is explained
in section B.5 in the appendix. In tables 18 and 19, we change the duration of the
PhD to 5 and 7 years, respectively, and report the results.
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) -0.648 -0.502 -0.609
(0.659) (0.584) (1.035)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.220∗∗∗ 1.455∗∗ 2.502∗
(0.738) (0.603) (1.359)
Subsample All All All
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 18: Alternative duration of PhD (5 Years)
The effect at graduation stays the same, of course, but the effect at application
all but vanishes. We interpret this as a support for our argument of an estimated
difference of 6 years between application and graduation.
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Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) -0.325 -0.853 -0.420
(0.730) (0.528) (1.275)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.200∗∗∗ 1.467∗∗ 2.502∗
(0.661) (0.599) (1.287)
Subsample All All Academic
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 19: Alternative duration of PhD (7 Years)
E.5 The Tier 1 Subsample
We also consider the subsample of economists who graduated from the elite tier 1
schools and repeat all our regressions for these highly skilled individuals. According
to table 20, the magnitude of the effects appears to be larger in all considered di-
mensions. With regard to productivity, the estimates are significant on conventional
levels. The only exception is the effect of unemployment change on productivity at
graduation, which is insignificant but correctly directed. The effect at application and
at graduation on the propensity to become an academic for our preferred measure is
strong and highly significant. If we consider the two alternative measures of being an
academic, the result is weaker, not significant, but correctly directed (see table 21).
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 5.394∗∗ -1.716∗∗∗ 9.864∗∗∗
(2.123) (0.579) (2.935)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 4.347∗ 2.866∗∗∗ 3.969
(2.385) (0.938) (3.449)
Subsample Tier 1 Tier 1 Academic Tier 1
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 234 234 232
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 20: Main regression results (Tier 1)
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Academic Faculty Publish
Unempl Change (Application) -1.716∗∗∗ -0.080 -1.276
(0.579) (0.822) (0.881)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.866∗∗∗ 0.719 0.532
(0.938) (0.474) (0.786)
Subsample Tier 1 Tier 1 Tier 1
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 234 234 234
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 21: Alternative measures for being academic (Tier 1)
E.6 Exclusion of Superstar-Economists
Finally, we want to make sure that our results are not driven by the exceptional
performance of very few superstar-economists whose extraordinary talent would have
made them academics independently of any state of the business cycle. First, consider
Figure 8: The publication distribution
in figure 8 the distribution of individuals’ publication success as a histogram and over
time. The modus and the median of the distribution of publications is zero while the
mean is 31.49. Only 80 economists achieve more than 500 publication points with
Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz scoring a stunning maximum of 1738 points. In table
22, we report the results of our main regressions 2 if we remove the 80 economists
who publish more than 500 points. We see that our main results are not driven by
these “outliers”.
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